

## Homework Set 2

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**SOLVE THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS:**

**Problem 1 (10pts).** Let  $k \geq 1$  be an integer. Recall that for a chi-squared random variable with  $k$  degrees of freedom, the probability density function is given by:

$$f_k(x) = \frac{x^{k/2-1} \exp(-x/2)}{2^{k/2} \Gamma(k/2)} \quad \text{for } x > 0$$

where  $\Gamma(x) = \int_0^\infty t^{x-1} e^{-t} dt$  is the Gamma function. Show that  $\ln f_k$  is convex when  $k = 1, 2$  and concave when  $k \geq 2$ .

REMARKS: In general, we say that a function  $f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$  is **logarithmically convex** (resp. **logarithmically concave**) if  $\ln f$  is convex (resp. concave). Note that  $\ln f$  is well-defined whenever  $f(x) > 0$  for all  $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ .

**Problem 2 (25pts).** Let  $p, q > 1$  be such that  $1/p + 1/q = 1$ . Define:

$$C_p = \{(t, x) \in \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}^n : t \geq 0, \|x\|_p \leq t\}$$

- (a) Show that  $C_p$  is a convex cone.
- (b) Show that  $C_p^* = C_q$  (recall that  $C_p^*$  is the dual cone of  $C_p$ ). (*Hint: Hölder's inequality.*)

**Problem 3 (20pts).** Let  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$  and  $b \in \mathbb{R}^m$  be given. Consider the function  $v : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  given by:

$$\begin{aligned} v(c) &:= \text{minimize } c^T x \\ &\text{subject to } Ax = b \\ &\quad x \geq \mathbf{0} \end{aligned}$$

Show that  $v(\cdot)$  is a concave function on the set  $S = \{c \in \mathbb{R}^n : v(c) > -\infty\}$ . (*Hint: Consider the dual LP.*)

**Problem 4 (25pts).** Consider a **production game** defined as follows. Let  $\mathcal{N} = \{1, \dots, n\}$  be the set of players, each of whom is given a vector  $b^i = (b_1^i, \dots, b_m^i)$  ( $i = 1, \dots, n$ ) of resources. These resources can be used to produce goods, which in turn can be sold at a given market price. Specifically, we assume the following production model: for player  $i \in \mathcal{N}$ , a unit of the  $j$ -th good ( $j = 1, \dots, p$ ) requires  $a_{kj}^i$  units of the  $k$ -th resource ( $k = 1, \dots, m$ ) to produce. Furthermore, the  $j$ -th good can be sold at a price  $c_j$ , where  $j = 1, \dots, p$ .

Now, let  $S \subset \mathcal{N}$  be a coalition of players. Such a coalition will possess:

$$b_k(S) = \sum_{i \in S} b_k^i$$

units of the  $k$ -th resource, where  $k = 1, \dots, m$ . Using all of their resources, the coalition  $S$  can produce any vector  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_p) \in \mathbb{R}_+^p$  of goods that satisfies  $A(S)x \leq b(S)$ , where:

$$A(S)_{kj} = \min_{i \in S} \{a_{kij}^i\} \quad \text{for } k = 1, \dots, m; j = 1, \dots, p \quad \text{and} \quad b(S) = (b_1(S), \dots, b_m(S))$$

Naturally, a coalition  $S$  would like to maximize its revenue, and the optimization problem it faces can be formulated as the following LP:

$$\begin{aligned} v(S) \quad &:= \quad \text{maximize} \quad c^T x \\ &\text{subject to} \quad A(S)x \leq b(S) \\ &\quad \quad \quad x \geq \mathbf{0} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

The function  $v$  will be the value function of this game. Recall that an allocation vector  $z = (z_1, \dots, z_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n$  is in the core iff  $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} z_i = v(\mathcal{N})$  and  $\sum_{i \in S} z_i \geq v(S)$  for all  $S \subset \mathcal{N}$ .

- (a) Consider the LP faced by the grand coalition  $\mathcal{N}$ . Write down its dual LP.
- (b) Suppose that the dual LP given in (a) is feasible, and let  $y^*$  be one of its optimal solutions. Show that the allocation vector:

$$z^* = \left( (b^1)^T y^*, (b^2)^T y^*, \dots, (b^n)^T y^* \right) \in \mathbb{R}^n$$

belongs to the core.

**Problem 5 (20pts).** Let  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$  and  $b \in \mathbb{R}_+^m$ . Consider the following system:

$$Ax = b, \quad x \geq \mathbf{0} \tag{2}$$

and the related LP:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{minimize} \quad e^T y \\ &\text{subject to} \quad Ax + Iy = b \\ &\quad \quad \quad x \geq \mathbf{0}, y \geq \mathbf{0} \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Here,  $e = (1, \dots, 1) \in \mathbb{R}^m$ , and  $I$  is the  $m \times m$  identity matrix. The LP (3) is usually known as the **Phase One Problem**.

- (a) Write down the dual of (3).
- (b) Show that (3) always has an optimal solution.
- (c) Show that the system (2) has a solution iff the optimal value of (3) is zero.